Introduction
Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA) created a tradable emissions allowance system to control emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) produced when coal and oil are burned in electric utility boilers. 2 SO 2 is the primary precursor of acid rain and other acidic depositions, and the SO 2 emissions control policy provided for by Title IV was designed specifically to effect a substantial reduction in those depositions. 3 The program relies on a marketbased approach to controlling emissions, rather than the traditional command-and-control approach of specifying source-specific standards. 4 This mechanism involves the specification of de facto property rights for emissions that can be freely traded, and it gives electric utilities complete flexibility in determining how they will comply with their obligations under the law. Largely because it relies on an innovative market-based mechanism for controlling emissions, the SO 2 allowance trading program has attracted considerable interest. This paper examines how the market for SO 2 allowances has evolved since Title IV was passed in 1990 and evaluates criticisms of the allowance trading institutions created by Title IV that have been advanced by Cason (1993 Cason ( , 1995 , Cason and Plott (1996) , and Hausker (1992) . These critiques are based on theoretical analysis and experimental evidence which deal with auctions 2 The 1990 CAAA is Public Law 101-549.
3The asserted target was a 10 million ton per year (about 50%) reduction from 1980 emissions levels by the year 2000. 4 High ambient concentrations of SO 2 have long been thought to have adverse effects on human health, and National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for gaseous SO 2 have been in effect since the early 1970s. Ambient concentrations have declined significantly since that time because of state and federal command-and-control regulation, and most of the population now lives in areas that meet the NAAQS for SO2. Recent work has suggested that acid aerosols, to which SO 2 emissions give rise, have significant adverse health effects, but no regulatory program currently addresses this issue directly. See, generally, EPA (1995).
operating in isolation; other opportunities to trade are assumed away. Cason (1993, p. 178-179) recognizes the issue:
"The EPA auction will interact with other private markets that may be developed for permit trading....and that with sufficient activity they can help mitigate the negative features of the EPA auction. We view the interaction of these different market
institutions as an open empirical question that can only be resolved after observing several years of organized trading...."
Our analysis heeds this counsel and relies on the considerable information now available on actual transactions (as well as offers to buy and sell) in the market for SO2 allowances. Overall, we find that the design flaws emphasized by the critics have not had significant adverse effects on market performance, largely because the market institutions on which the critics have focused have not played --and were never intended to play --central roles in the actual trading process. 5 Although SO 2 emissions control obligations of the first group of electricity generators affected by Title IV did not take effect until 1995, the first allowance trades were reported in May,
1992. There are two very different venues in which allowance trading takes place. As we discuss in more detail below, the vast majority of allowance trading has involved bilateral private trades between utilities that own electric generators or between those utilities and third parties. 6 The third parties include allowance brokers, acting for their own account or on behalf of electricity generators, as well as fuel suppliers who bundle the sales of allowances with the sale of fuel to 5 The flaws in the auction design could be more empirically important if the EPA auctions were the only way that allowances could be traded. Thus we are not arguing that the auction design issues that have been raised would not be significant in other contexts. Similarly, we are not arguing that other auction designs might not have done more to hasten the development of the overall market. 6 We exclude from this discussion (and from Table I below) "intra-utility" trades, such as reallocations of allowances between generating units owned by the same company and transactions between affiliates of the same holding company. electric utilities. Although these transactions are generally confidential, some information on individual transactions is available in the trade press. More importantly, there are three major private market-making organizations that regularly publish information on allowance prices in consummated transactions as well as on bids to buy and offers to sell. The information published by these market-makers can be used to define "the market price" for allowances at any particular point in time.
The second way that allowances have been traded is through a set of annual auctions that Section 416(d)(2) of the CAAA requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to hold. The auctions were first held in March 1993 and have taken place every March since then. As this is written, we have data on four years of auctions, covering a total of eleven separate auctions.
The structure of these auctions has been criticized by Cason (1993 Cason ( , 1995 , Cason and Plott (1996) , and Hausker (1992). As we shall discuss below, the positive conclusions reached in these papers are, at best, only weakly consistent with the data. This seems to reflect the fact that the EPA auctions have been only a small part of the overall allowance market, while Cason (1993 Cason ( , 1995 and Cason and Plott (1996) , in particular, proceed as if the auctions were the whole market. For the same reason, the critics substantially over-state the potential adverse effects of defects in auction design on overall market efficiency. With the possible exception of the initial EPA auctions, which took place as the private market was just beginning to develop, the EPA auctions that have attracted so much attention in the academic literature have been of minimal relevance for the overall performance of the market. Auction prices and associated bidding behavior and private market prices are now closely linked with one another. The paper proceeds in the following way. The next section provides a brief discussion of Title IV of the CAAA, the associated allowance trading system, and how it is being phased in.
Section 3 outlines the critiques referred to above. Section 4 examines the time patterns of allowance prices that have been observed so far, drawing on observation of both private market transactions and the EPA's annual auctions. Section 5 examines the auction results in more detail and compares them with the predictions drawn by critics from previous theoretical analyses and laboratory experiments. Section 6 presents our conclusions.
Title IV and Allowance Trading
The basic approach to emissions control embodied in Title IV is simple. Aggregate annual caps on national SO 2 emissions from certain electric generating units are specified by the statute.
These caps define the number of emissions allowances issued for use in each year. An emissions allowance is the right to emit one ton of SO2 into the atmosphere. In order legally to emit SO 2 into the atmosphere during a particular year, an electricity generator covered by the statute (called an "affected source" in the Act) must have enough allowances that are good for use in that year to cover all of its emissions. The CAAA requires each affected source to have continuous emissions monitoring equipment on each stack to measure actual SO z emissions and to report those emissions to the EPA. At the end of each year, each source must have deposited enough allowances in an account maintained for it by the EPA to cover all of the recorded emissions or be subject to significant financial (and legal) penalties.
The restrictions on SO 2 emissions are applied in two phases. Phase I covers the 263 dirtiest large generating units in the country and requires them, in the aggregate, to reduce their emissions substantially, to about 5.7 million tons per year, during the period 1995 -1999. 7 Phase II, which begins in 2000, tightens the emissions cap further and extends it to virtually all electric generating units. About 9 million allowances will be issued annually during Phase II.
Title IV also specifies the initial allocation of SO 2 allowances. Allowances are given to existing electric generating units and those under construction according to fairly complicated rules that are discussed in detail by Joskow and Schmalensee (1996) . For our purposes here it suffices to note that essentially all of the allowances available to cover SO 2 emissions were allocated "free" to incumbent sources. Each allowance specifies a particular year, its "vintage," in which it is first available to be used to cover SO02 emissions; an allowance can also be "banked" and used in any future year. Thus, for instance, a "1996 vintage" allowance can be used to cover emissions in 1996 or held for use in any later year, but it cannot be used to cover 1995 emissions. Most importantly, all allowances are fully tradable. That is, a source that has been allocated allowances is free to sell them to any other source, including to a third party such as brokers and individuals. Moreover, an affected source can buy allowances to cover its present emissions or its future emissions from any type of trading partner. There are no limitations on how often parties can trade allowances or on the trading mechanisms that buyers and sellers may use to trade them.
Finally, Title IV created two mechanisms intended to help "jump-start" the market. The more important is a set of small annual revenue neutral allowance auctions that are administered by the EPA. Each year, roughly 2.8% of the allowances that have been allocated to utilities are held
In fact, an additional 182 generating units that were not otherwise due to become "affected sources" until Phase II became affected in Phase I through special (substitution unit or compensating unit) provisions of a compliance plan for one or more of the original 263 Phase I units. See EPA (1996) for statistics and Joskow and Schmalensee (1996) for summaries of these provisions. back and auctioned in annual "spot" and "advance" auctions. In the 1993, 1994, and 1995 spot auctions, 50,000 vintage 1995 allowances were offered for sale. In 1996, 150,000 vintage 1996 allowances were sold. In 1997 In , 1998 In , and 1999 ,000 allowances with vintages matching each of those years will also be sold. In 2000 and later years, 100,000 allowances will be sold in the annual spot auction. In 1993 and all later years, 100,000 allowances are offered for sale in the seven-year advance auction. Allowances sold in the advance auction are first usable seven years after the auction. Thus, vintage 2000 allowances were sold in 1993, vintage 2001 allowances in 1994, and so on. The revenues from these sales are returned to the sources in proportion to their share of the allowances that were held back for the auctions. In addition, private parties are permitted but not required to offer allowances for sale in either EPA auction. 8 Each voluntary offer to sell allowances in the EPA auctions involves both a quantity and a minimum acceptable (i.e., reservation) price.
Much attention has been paid to the specific auction mechanism that was implemented by the EPA's regulations. Title IV [Section 416(d)(2)] provides that: "...the auctioned allowances shall be allocated and sold on the basis of bid price, starting with the highest-priced bid and continuing until all allowances for sale at auction have been allocated."
The EPA has thus far interpreted this statutory language as requiring it to implement a "discriminatory" auction in which the allowances withheld for auction by the EPA are allocated to the highest bidders and the winning bidders must pay the price they have bid rather than a uniform 8Allowances may also be voluntarily offered for sale in the six-year advance auction described below. There are no restrictions on sales of allowances outside of the EPA auctions. market clearing price. 9 Allowances submitted voluntarily by private parties for sale in the EPA auction are allocated after the supply of withheld allowances have been fully allocated. At that point, the seller with the lowest reservation price is matched with the remaining buyer with the highest bid, the seller with the second lowest reservation price is matched with the remaining buyer with the second highest bid, etc., until there are no more bids to buy that exceed the reservation prices submitted by sellers. 10 When private allowances are sold in this way, the seller receives the buyer's bid price.
In addition to the annual auctions, 25,000 allowances per year are allocated to a "Direct Sales Reserve" beginning in 1993. These allowances are available for purchase at a price of $1,500, adjusted for post-1990 inflation; they are first valid seven years from the date they are made available for purchase. Beginning in the year 2000, the Reserve also makes 25,000 spot allowances per year available for purchase at $1,500 (adjusted for post-1990 inflation). In the event the
Reserve is over-subscribed, the statute gives preference to independent power producers constructing new capacity. In the event some allowances in the Reserve are not purchased within a year, the remaining allowances are auctioned in a separate "six-year advance" auction in the following year at the same time the other two auctions take place. Thus, for instance, the 1993
Reserve made available vintage 2000 allowances for $1500 each. As none were sold by the time of the 1994 auctions, 25,000 vintage 2000 allowances were auctioned in a 1994 six-year advance auction. Since allowance prices have always been far below $1500, all of the allowances made 9 The EPA has recently solicited comments on whether it has the statutory authority to switch to single-price auctions and whether such a switch would be desirable, as well as on whether it would be desirable to move the auctions from March to October of each year. See Federal Register, June 6, 1996 (Volume 61, Number 110), pp. 28996-28997.
private trading arrangements, not the EPA auctions, would be the primary mechanisms through which allowances would be traded. Accordingly, neither the CAAA nor the regulations implementing it place any restrictions on the kinds of bilateral arrangements, brokering, and private auction institutions that private parties can turn to in order to mediate allowance trades.
Critiques of Allowance Trading Institutions
Even though the annual statutory auctions were designed primarily to "jump-start" the market, not to be the primary venue for trading allowances, they have attracted a significant amount of attention and criticism in the literature. Indeed, one would think from the discussion in the literature that the EPA auctions are the main, or even the only, mechanism through which allowances can be traded.
Hausker ( Similarly, Hausker notes that the idea of having a discriminatory auction came from House staff. As he observes, it is not clear in theory that this design will produce more revenue than a uniform-price auction, though the House staff were unshakably convinced that it would.
14 Senate staff and the Administration preferred a single-price auction. Both were concerned that a discriminatory auction would be a less transparent price discovery mechanism, and the Administration argued that a discriminatory auction would likely discourage participation by regulated utilities and/or lead them to under-bid." Nonetheless, Administration economists did not consider this a major issue. Their view was that if there were no serious obstacles preventing the development of an allowance market, a discriminatory auction could, at worst, slow that development somewhat, while if there were serious obstacles, fixing the auction design would not suffice to create a viable market.
'3 The second author participated in Administration policy-making on this issue.
14 The second author spent hours trying unsuccessfully to persuade the House staff involved that buyers would not simply bid their reservation prices in this auction. He was accused of not understanding basic economics. For a recent discussion of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature, see Laffont (1995) , pp. 24-25. 1 The problem is that state utility regulators can disallow utility costs that they find to have been "imprudently" incurred, and if utility A pays more for allowances than utility B at the same auction, A becomes potentially vulnerable to such a finding. This potential vulnerability can only discourage aggressive bidding. Cason (1993 Cason ( , 1995 and Cason and Plott (1996) argue that voluntary sellers in the EPA auctions have incentives to set reservation prices too low. Cason (1993 Cason ( , 1995 models sellers as engaged in a private value auction: The gain from sales of an allowance at the auction equals the price less the seller's individual marginal cost of reducing SO 2 emissions by a ton. The central argument is that in the EPA auction, lowering one's reservation price both increases the likelihood of a sale and, conditional on a sale occurring, increases the expected price received as long as buyers' bids are not identical. Thus, lower reservation prices will be set by rational sellers than in a single-price auction, all else equal. It may even be optimal to set a reservation price below the marginal cost of emissions reduction, even though this creates a positive probability of an unprofitable trade. Cason (1995) finds some experimental support for this downward bias in seller reservation prices. 1 6
In addition, Cason and Plott (1996) argue informally that buyers in the EPA auctions, whose gain from purchase is assumed to be the marginal control cost avoided minus the price paid, have an incentive not to bid above the expected market-clearing price. 1 7 While this is plausible behavior, it is not clear either that it is optimal or that by itself such bidding would tend to bias down prices. Cason and Plott (1996) find experimentally that "compared to more standard uniform-price call auctions, the EPA auction generates lower market-clearing prices and extracts less gains from exchange" (p. 157). '6 Cason's (1995) paper is a little confusing at first blush because his theoretical analysis and the laboratory experiments invert the structure of the EPA's auction so that the sellers are buyers and the buyers are sellers.
17 They do not offer a formal characterization of an equilibrium in the EPA auction in which both buyers and sellers behave strategically. Cason (1993) discusses some of the complexities involved.
As we noted above, Cason (1993, p. 178) acknowledges that other venues for allowance trading will interact with the EPA auctions, and "should these alternative trading mechanisms develop, the additional trading opportunities will place opportunity cost bounds on the allowance values for EPA auction participants." In the extreme case, in which the outside market is perfectly competitive and without frictions, the "opportunity cost bounds" serve to transform the EPA auction into a common value auction. The universally known market price of allowances, call it P*, replaces individual marginal control costs in buyers' and sellers' strategic calculations, and the equilibrium auction price must equal P*. Given the competitive market alternative, no buyer will pay more than P*, and no seller will take less. Only if the non-auction part of the market is seriously imperfect --or, in the limiting case assumed by Cason (1993 Cason ( , 1995 and Cason and Plott (1996) , nonexistent --can auction prices depart substantially from competitive market prices. More generally, if buyers' bids are all close to P* (or any other number), sellers' incentives to quote low reservation prices in order to be matched with high bids will be essentially eliminated. Cason and Plott (1996) assert that through early 1994 the allowance market did not impose tight "opportunity cost bounds" on the EPA auction, but they present only anecdotal evidence to support this assertion. In what follows we attempt a systematic examination of the evidence available through mid-1996. We find that as private trading institutions have matured, the prices and bidding behavior in the EPA auctions have become closely linked to trading opportunities in the private market. Thus, if the critics' analyses have any implications at all for the SO 2 allowance market, they are likely to be relevant only to the earliest auctions, which took place early in the development of an active private market and associated trading institutions. Moreover, the behavior of voluntary sellers, who have had at most a trivial impact on the market, suggests overstatement, not under-statement, of reservation prices.
Market Prices and Quantities
At the time Title IV was passed a number of projections of future allowance prices were made available to the EPA and published in the trade press. These projections were based on costminimizing optimization models for the electric power sector that embodied assumptions about future fuel prices, electricity demand growth, utility trading behavior, and the costs of reducing SO 2 emissions through fuel-switching, coal-cleaning, and flue-gas desulfurization (scrubbing).
Allowance prices during Phase I were generally projected to be in the $250-$350 range and prices for allowances in Phase II in the $500-$700 range.' 8 These projections were the primary information available to buyers and sellers when allowances began to be traded, first through a few bilateral trades and then in the EPA's first set of mandatory auctions in March 1993.
In fact, prices have turned out to be much lower than those early projections. Indeed, prices for spot market Phase I allowances have gone as low as $63 per ton and are about $80 per ton as this is written. It seems that post-1990 developments in markets for coal from the Powder River basin in Wyoming are central to the large differences between projected and actual prices (see Ellerman and Montero (1996) ). In any case, these large differences counsel humility about both the accuracy of the models available for analyzing policies of this sort and, more generally, about our 8 See, for instance, ICF (1990) and Braine (1991) . The large difference in price projections for Phase I and Phase II does not make a lot of economic sense, since Phase I allowances can be banked for use in Phase II. However, the models used to make these projections did not take intertemporal arbitrage opportunities into account. The $1,500 price set for the Direct Sales Reserve was designed to be significantly above the range of price projections that were being relied upon when the CAAA was being debated.
ability to estimate the cost of complying with new environmental restrictions when polluters are allowed to employ the most economical compliance strategies they can devise. While these issues are important, pursuing them further would carry us beyond the bounds of this study. Finally, we have extensive information reported on the EPA's annual March auctions from 1993 through 1996. This information includes bid prices and quantities submitted by each buyer, the prices at which allowances and associated quantities were offered voluntarily for sale by individual sellers, the bid price that cleared the EPA's mandatory sales auctions, and the bid price that cleared the associated voluntary private sales auction. We also have the trading names used by each of the winning bidders and the associated prices and quantities that each bid. These names usually allow a meaningful identification of the winning bidders, though some bidders trade under special "trading names" (which is perfectly legal) to maintain confidentiality. Moreover, some buyers rely on intermediaries to bid for them in the auction for the same reason. We will explore this information in more detail in the next section. allowances of an undisclosed vintage to PSI Energy at a price of $205 per ton for allowances received in 1995.
Terms of the trade released indicate that the allowances were to be supplied by Wisconsin Electric Power Company over an 8 year period beginning in 1995, and that the price, $205 per ton, is to be escalated over the remainder of the contract at an undisclosed rate. and sell. As is evident from Figure 1 , the prices reported by the three organizations for allowances sold and offered for sale or purchase in the private market were almost identical by late 1994.
Moreover, the March 1995 and March 1996 EPA auctions yielded market clearing prices that were virtually identical to the prices reported for the three price indices. (We can't match the prices precisely because we only have monthly observation for the three private market indices).
Let us now turn from prices to quantities. Table 1 reports information on the number of allowances that appear to have been traded through both the EPA's auctions and in private transactions through the first quarter of 1996. The first column reports the total number of allowances, withheld and privately offered, sold in each of the EPA's annual auctions. In total, fewer than 800,000 allowances have been traded through the EPA's mandatory and voluntary private auctions. The volume of private market transactions is more difficult to determine since there is no source that reports the precise quantity of allowances covered by purchase and sale agreements. We have made use of the data contained in the EPA's allowance tracking system to make a lower bound estimate of the volume of trades that took place during various time periods between 1992 when the first trades took place and the latest EPA auction in March 1996. To understand how we have made these estimates we must explain briefly how the EPA's allowance tracking system works.
The EPA established a computerized allowance tracking system to keep track of allowance allocations, to record reallocations of allowances between generating units over time (via banking), and to match emissions from a specific source in each year with the allowances it possesses.
Initially, all generating units that were allocated allowances through the statutory provisions of Title IV were given an individual allowance account in the EPA's computer system. Their allocations of allowances for each future year (through the year 2025) were placed in these accounts. Third parties that are involved in trading allowances can also establish accounts in the EPA's allowance tracking system, and those that bid in the EPA auctions must establish such accounts to receive any allowances that they may purchase through the auctions.
At the end of each year, each affected generating unit must have enough allowances of appropriate vintages (the current year's vintage or earlier) in its account to cover its emissions for that year. Utilities that own multiple generating units may shift allowances between accounts to cover their emissions. When allowances are bought or sold through private transactions, the trades must eventually be recorded in the EPA's allowance tracking system in order for the allowances to be used to cover emissions, but parties are under no obligation to record private trades with the EPA within any particular period after they have been consummated. (The EPA automatically records allowances traded in its annual auctions as soon as the results from the auction are made publicly available.) Our understanding is that prompt recording of private trades is the rule rather than the exception, however. 27 Nonetheless, since there is no doubt some lag between the time a deal is struck and the time allowances are moved between accounts in the EPA's allowance tracking system, the recorded data must lag behind actual commercial transactions to some extent. 28 We have accessed the EPA's allowance tracking system to identify commercial trades based on the recorded movement of allowances between accounts. We first identified all movements of 27 Telephone interview with Eugene Casey, Acid Rain Division, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, June 1996. 28 To record an allowance transfer with EPA, the parties have had to submit a form signed by authorized representatives of both accounts involved, and EPA has undertaken to record the transfer within five business days. To speed up this process, EPA has recently announced that it is considering the development of a system to allow electronic submittal of allowance transfers. See Federal Register, June 6, 1996 (Volume 61, Number 110), pp. 28996-28997. allowances between accounts. We then deducted allowances that were associated with special EPA allocations (e.g. bonus allowances made available for scrubbers; see Joskow and Schmalensee (1996) ), EPA auctions, reallocations, and intra-utility trades to identify all changes in allowance allocations between unaffiliated entities. We believe that this provides a good lower bound estimate of private allowance transactions because it measures all private trades that the parties have chosen to record in the EPA's allowance tracking system. It may not measure all private trading activity, because there is no obligation to record trades for allowances until the holder desires to use the allowances for compliance purposes. In addition, this number represents a lower bound estimate of private trading activity since any trading pursuant to option agreements would, not be recorded until options are actually exercised. 29 The second column of data in Table I reports private allowance trades that were recorded in the year proceeding each of the EPA's auctions, including the month of the auction, except for the first auction for which the period covers all private trades (as defined above) recorded by EPA before the auction took place. All together, by March 1996 about 6.7 million allowances were traded through private transactions, as compared to 0.8 million through the EPA auctions. 30 It is also evident from Table 1 that there was very little private trading activity prior to the second quarter of 1994. About 6.4 of the 6.7 million allowances that were privately traded up through March 1996 were traded after March 1994. Company an option to purchase Phase I allowances (quantity and prices were not disclosed). To date this option has not been exercised and consequently this trading activity does not show up in the EPA's allowance tracking system. stressed by Cason (1993 Cason ( , 1995 and Cason and Plott (1996) . As we discuss in more detail below, however, almost no privately-offered allowances were sold in the first two EPA auctions, so that the seller-side bias stressed by Cason (1993 Cason ( , 1995 can have had no effect. Any downward bias.
must reflect a bias in buyers' bids, for which the theoretical case is not strong. In any case, the coupling between the EPA auctions and the rest of the market does not appear particularly tight in the early period. * Beginning around May 1994, however, Figure 1 shows that private market prices come ; almost exactly into line with the results of the March 1994 EPA auction. This casts significant tdbuod on the downward bias h onthesis It seems a•t lpeat as nlausible that on_ ,,-t-i., i,,, ,,. hA d
been held up artificially by the earlier projections of higher prices. The early auctions suggested, correctly as it turned out, that those projections were too high. These suggestions may well have deterred some investments (in scrubbers, for instance) that were attractive at projected allowance prices but would have been uneconomic at the prices prevailing in the market after mid-1994.
By the March 1995 auction, market values in all trading venues were essentially the same.
In Cason's (1993) language, the "opportunity cost bounds" placed on auction participants by "additional trading opportunities" had plainly become tight. As uncertainty about allowance are novelty purchases or purchases by groups attempting to make a statement. If one wants to purchase a small quantity of allowances for whatever reason, the EPA's auction is the place to do so.
because utilities and intermediaries will not deal in such small quantities. The fact that some environmental groups and law student associations bid such high prices once abundant information about prices have become available suggests that they were either uninformed about the state of the market, or were so eager to obtain an allowance that they bid a price high enough to ensure that they would get one, or that they attached some positive value to purchase at a high price. Table 2 provides some numerical evidence on the behavior of successful bidders in the EPA auctions. The Table shows the percentage difference between the average price paid and the lowest price paid (the market-clearing price) in each auction. As we noted above, if the private market were frictionless and perfectly competitive, all serious commercial bidders in the EPA auctions would simply bid the market price. The smaller the differences shown in Table 2 , the more closely buyer behavior in the EPA auction conforms to this ideal. Consistent with the discussion so far, it would be hard to argue that bidders in the 1993 auctions had a good idea of the market-clearing price. It would be a good deal easier to make this argument for the 1994 auctions, despite the paucity of trades before March 1994. In the 1995 and 1996 auctions, it seems clear that the frictionless, perfectly competitive ideal is a good approximation to reality, despite the continued presence of a few non-commercial high bidders.
At the other end of the price spectrum, while by 1995 the very "low ball" bids that would clearly be out of the money have largely disappeared, there continues to remain a long tail of offers to buy at prices that are up to around 10% below the best available information about market prices.
Putting in bids slightly below expected market price makes perfectly good sense for a regulated electric utility seeking to purchase allowances. First, the price that will clear the market is not known with certainty and, in an auction with essentially no transactions costs, there is nothing to lose by throwing in bids at prices slightly lower than those being quoted in the private market, especially since there are likely to be transactions costs associated with substitutable private market sales. If the buyer gets nothing in the annual EPA auction and needs allowances, the private market will be open for business the next day and every day thereafter, so there are no opportunity costs associated with putting in a low bid. This, of course, would not be the case if the EPA's auction were the only way to acquire allowances. Second, regulated electric utilities may prefer to acquire allowances through confidential private market transactions that provide flexibility to arrange the ideal portfolio of allowance quantities and vintages rather than through the EPA auction. However, the prices the utility negotiates may be subject to scrutiny by their state regulatory commissions.
By submitting bids to the EPA auctions at prices slightly below the prevailing private market values, the utility has a response to the regulator's question "How do we know that you paid the lowest reasonable price for the allowances?"
Finally, let us turn to the offers to sell allowances through the voluntary "private" sellers component of the EPA's auction on which Cason (1993 Cason ( , 1995 and Cason and Plott (1996) focus. offered for sale were typically offered at prices significantly higher than the market-clearing price.
As a result, less than one percent of the allowances offered were sold, and only about a third of a percent of the allowances sold in the EPA auctions were voluntarily offered (as opposed to the allowances withheld by law by EPA). In all, only 2,610 allowances have been sold using the private seller mechanism out of almost 780,000 that have been sold in EPA auctions and almost 7.5 million that have been traded overall.
This suggests that rather than reservation prices of voluntarily offered allowances being under-stated in the EPA auctions, the possibility that concerns Cason (1993 Cason ( , 1995 and Cason and Plott (1996) , reservation prices are in fact over-stated relative to the alternative of private sales. The evidence on buyer behavior in Table 2 makes it clear that this pattern cannot be explained by a lack of information in the market. The most plausible explanation seems to be that some utilities use the EPA auction process to demonstrate to regulators that they could not sell their allowances at prices above those prevailing in the private market. In addition, as we noted above in connection with the persistence of "low-ball" bids, there is no cost to offer to sell at a high reservation price. Such a sale would be found money to the utility.
Most importantly, Table 3 makes clear that, if the EPA auctions have become a sideshow to the private allowance market, the private sale component of those auctions has always been a very minor act in that sideshow. However serious the flaws in the auctions' provisions for voluntary allowance sales, they clearly cannot have had a discernible effect on the performance of the allowance market as a whole.
Summary and Conclusions
It was clear to its proponents that the success of Title IV's innovative tradable allowance program for reducing sulfur dioxide emissions depended critically on the emergence of an effective private allowance market. At the insistence of some affected interests concerned that a robust market would not develop, an EPA-administered allowance auction and a provision for direct allowance sales at a high price were added to Title IV. Critics have pointed to apparent shortcomings in these mechanisms, particularly in the design of the annual allowance auctions that EPA is required to hold.
Our analysis of actual experience in the sulfur dioxide allowance market indicates that an effective private market has in fact developed. While it is impossible to say if an alternate auction mechanism would have hastened that development noticeably, it is clear that since mid-1994, the EPA auctions have been driven by the private market rather than vice versa. It does not appear that the aspects of those auctions that have attracted critical academic attention have had any effect at all on the actual operation of the market for S02 allowances in recent years. And it seems absolutely clear that the incentive for strategic seller behavior advanced by Cason (1993 Cason ( , 1995 and Cason and Plott (1996) has exerted absolutely no downward pressure on allowance prices in the real world.
While the EPA auction design might very well have led to substantial inefficiencies if the auctions were the only venue for allowance trading, the fact that buyers and sellers have relied primarily on other trading mechanisms has made the EPA auctions largely irrelevant to market The number of allowances sold in the private market includes inter-utility trades, trades between utilities and third parties, and trades between two non-utility parties. This number excludes intra-utility trades (including intra-holding company trades), reallocations, and options to trade which have not been exercised. 
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